A Well-Ordered Society as a Democratic Community: Alternative Readings of Rawls’ Political Theory by Ana Matan
 
Matan, A., A Well-Ordered Society as ..., Politička misao, Vol. XLI, (2004), No. 5, pp. 123–133 123 
                                                                                                                                              
Political Theory  
                                                                                                                                              
Prethodno priopćenje 
321.7.01 
1 Rawls, J. 
Primljeno: 31. svibnja 2005. 
                                                                                                                                              
 
A Well-Ordered Society as a Democratic Community: 
Alternative Readings of Rawls’ Political Theory 
 









 The standard reading of Rawls’ political theory puts great emphasis on Rawls’ 
liberalism and the primacy of basic liberties. The standard reading usually ignores 
Rawls’ remark that he is trying to develop most appropriate moral basis for a 
democratic society. An alternative reading, offered in the article, tries to bring out 
the democratic elements in Rawls’ thought and present Rawls’ concern for social 
justice as an attempt to offer a plausible account of a democratic community and 
the preconditions for democratic legitimacy. Still, the alternative reading has to be 
carefully distinguished from the interpretation of Rawls offered by Richard Rorty 
who claims that Rawls is only articulating the liberal and democratic features of 
present day societies without ambitions to justify their practices and political 
culture. For the alternative democratic readings of Rawls it is crucial to 
understand the “problem of stability” and Rawls’ solution to it. 
 
Key words: John Rawls, Richard Rorty, justification, democracy, stability 
 
Mailing address: Fakultet političkih znanosti, Lepušićeva 6, HR 10000 




 In a review essay entitled The House that Jack Built: Thirty Years of Reading Rawls, 
Anthony Simon Laden, one of the younger interpreters of Rawls’ work, makes a rather 
bold claim that in the past thirty years Rawls’ main philosophical intentions have been 
more or less misread (Laden, 2003). Laden identifies two main blueprints in the litera-
ture on Rawls’ work: “a standard one” and an “alternative” one. The standard blueprint 
of the structure of Rawls’ work includes four related elements: (1) Rawls is engaged in 
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a grand philosophical project; (2) in particular, he is developing a theory in the tradi-
tional sense of that word; (3) that theory is Hobbesian in that it starts from an account of 
human rationality; and (4) it aims to show the rationality of justice via its centerpiece, 
the argument from the original position in favor of the choice of the two principles of 
justice. These four elements of the standard blueprint capture a general trend in the way 
that people have read Rawls over the past thirty years (Laden, 2003: 371). 
 In short, the standard blueprint pictures Rawls as engaged in the same project as 
Plato or Hobbes and as concerned to give an account of justice starting from a (meta-
physical) theory of human nature and human rationality.1 Rawls’ claim that the best way 
to arrive at principles of justice is to ask what principles would be chosen by people 
when they find themselves in a situation of equality, is interpreted as a claim about what 
is the nature of justice in general and what kind of people would choose it. Thus, the 
original position, as the main device for producing principles of justice, produces also 
an image of us. “Looking from one direction through the lens of the original position we 
see the two principles of justice; looking from the other direction we see a reflection of 
ourselves” (Sandel, 1998: 48) Since the original position is meant to be a situation of 
equality, all peculiarities and particularities about its denizens are put behind “a veil of 
ignorance”. The parties present in the original position are “forced” to choose principles 
by trying to maximize certain “primary goods” as all-purpose means for the realization 
of any interest or life goal that they may turn out to have. In this interpretation Rawls is 
accused of an attempt to produce rational morality for rational humans, a project 
doomed to failure (Plant, 1991: 323-324). 
 Rejecting the standard blueprint for obscuring the most valuable parts of Rawls the-
ory, Laden proposes that Rawls be read in the “alternative blueprint”. We can summa-
rize the four elements [of the alternative blueprint] as follows: (1) Rawls's projects are 
focused and narrower than is generally thought; (2) he is engaged in philosophy as de-
fense rather than philosophical theorizing; (3) his arguments are meant to serve as pub-
lic justifications rather than as deductions from premises about human nature or ration-
ality; and (4) the central idea and high point of his achievement is the idea of public rea-
son and its accompanying picture of political deliberation, and the importance of the 
original position argument is that it is one possible route by which to justify principles 
of justice publicly (Laden, 2003: 379).  
 In what follows I will be agreeing with Laden that reading Rawls in the second blue-
print reveals the hidden potential of Rawls as a democratic theorist, but I would also 
point out that reading Rawls in the alternative blueprint may misrepresent Rawls’ in-
tentions. I shall try to show that the second blueprint should be clearly distinguished 
from the pragmatic “defense” of liberal democracy given by Richard Rorty in his fa-
mous essay Priority of Democracy to Philosophy (Rorty, 1994). Rorty's “pragmatism” 
fails to capture what Rawls himself thought was the most important and novel contribu-
tion of his work – the discussion of congruence and stability.2 For Rorty, Rawls’ great-
 
1 As typical of the standard blueprint we may mention Michael Sandel’s criticism in his Liberalism and 
the Limits of Justice (1982).  
2 As Samuel Freeman reports: “Rawls has said (in conversation) that he thinks the congruence argument 
was one of the most original contributions he made in A Theory of Justice” (Freeman, 2003: 308). Also in the 
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est achievement is in showing that liberal democracy doesn’t need philosophical foun-
dations. But, for Rawls, defending the possibility of a reasonably just constitutional de-
mocratic society involves much more than showing that democracy doesn't need (or can 
not have) philosophical foundations. Making democracy a coherent ideal or a “realistic 
utopia” involves a solution of the stability or a congruence issue, as Rawls calls them. It 
has to be shown that it is possible, at least in theory, to arrive at principles for adjudica-
tion of different social claims which, democratic citizens with conflicting visions of the 
human good could incorporate into their plans of life and therefore consider morally 
obliged to follow. Furthermore, principles meant to govern the political practice of de-
mocratic societies, should be self-supporting. In other words, once an ideal or, in Rawls’ 
vocabulary, a well-ordered society is set up, those who grow up in it would gain a sense 
of being justly treated and would respond in kind by normally complying with just 
institutions. “Solving” the problem of stability has driven Rawls (according to his own 
view) to somewhat revise his famous A Theory of Justice (1971.) and write Political 
liberalism (1993.).  
 
Rorty’s Pragmatic Defense of Democracy 
 Rorty's interpretation of Rawls is thus compatible mainly with the first two elements 
of the alternative blueprint, but it neglects the need for public justification, the role of 
public reason, and completely ignores Rawls’ preoccupation with questions of stability. 
As one of Rorty's commentaries rightly notices: “Rorty is concerned (one is tempted to 
say 'obsessed') with variations on a single theme – the meta-theoretical question of 
whether Rawls’ enterprise is one of 'articulation' of common intuitions and shared be-
liefs or a 'justification' of liberal democracy” (Bernstein, 1987: 546). Liberal society, 
permanently insists Rorty, is badly served by an attempt to supply it with “philosophical 
foundations”, and Rawls is praised for not being involved in a foundational project. 
Against the standard foundational reading, Rorty and other interpreters3 usually cite 
Rawls’ Dewey Lectures, entitled “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, where he 
says: The task is to articulate a public conception of justice that all can live with who 
regard their person and their relation to society in a certain way. What justifies a con-
ception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent and given to us, but its con-
gruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our reali-
zation that, given our history and traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most 
reasonable doctrine for us (Rawls, 1999: 306-307).  
 So, “in light of such passages”, claims Rorty, “A Theory of Justice no longer seems 
committed to a philosophical account of the human self, but only to a historico-socio-
logical description of the way we live now” (Rorty, 1994: 185). Rorty is content with 
the circular justification of principles of justice offered by Rawls’ reflective equilibrium. 
Rawls is thus seen as offering the only possible type of justification for liberal 
 
Introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls notes that “the problem of stability” has played very little role in 
the history of moral philosophy”, and yet “the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy” 
(Rawls, 1996, xix). 
3 See Rorty (1994: 185 and 1989: 58), also Kukhatas and Petit (1990: 123-124) and Plant (1991: 358). 
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democratic institutions. He starts from the intuitions of his fellow citizens and with the 
help of the original position constructs principles of justice. On Rorty’s view, those 
principles are “summarizing generalizations from which these intuitions can be de-
duced, with the help of noncontroversial lemmas” (Rorty, 1998: 171). The point of such 
generalizations is not to offer some truth about justice but “to increase the predictability, 
and thus the power and efficiency, of our institutions, thereby heightening the sense of 
shared moral identity that brings us together in a moral community” (Rorty, 1998: 171).  
 Thus, Rorty's pragmatic “defence” of democracy is made up of several distinct 
claims that Rorty himself does not separate clearly. The first, already mentioned claim 
is that democracy, or any society for that matter, does not need philosophical founda-
tions.4 Connected with the first is an argument about the liberating effect of discarding 
the need for a nonhuman foundation of social institutions. Once we get rid of the idea 
that there are “nonhuman forces to which human beings should be responsible, … finite, 
mortal, contingently existing human beings“ would no longer be able to derive mean-
ings of their lives except from “other finite, mortal, contingently existing human be-
ings” (Rorty, 1989: 45). If our existence is free from anything outside us, then we would 
be more inclined to feel deeply connected to other members of “the we group” which 
are typically members of our culture.5 Thus, the contingency of our existence should 
open the way to greater solidarity since for Rorty “epistemological thinking somehow 
clouds our identification with our community” (Kurelić, 2001: 151). 6 
 A second claim is that the only thing needed to sustain the liberal institutions is a 
liberal culture that “would regard the justification of liberal society simply as a matter of 
historical comparison with other attempts at social organization – those of the past and 
those envisaged by utopians” (Rorty, 1994: 53). Rorty appeals for an empirical and 
nonmetaphysical defense of democracy “of the sort Churchill offered when he said that 
it was ‘the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time’” (Rorty, 2004). The second claim is closely connected to an argu-
ment about diminishing pain and cruelty. Rorty claims that the only moral obligation we 
have is to diminish cruelty and pain, “and in particular… that special sort of pain which 
the brutes do not share with the humans – humiliation” (Rorty, 1989: 92). This moral 
obligation defines our public responsibilities. Even though Rorty has a view of history 
in which religion is replaced by science, or a love of God with a love of Truth, and fi-
nally they are both replaced by “mere” contingency and chance, he is aware that not all 
 
4 This claim is pretty strong, since Rorty believes that even “the collapse of the liberal democracies would 
not, in itself, provide much evidence for the claim that human societies can not survive without widely shared 
opinions on matters of ultimate importance – shared conceptions of our place in the universe and our mission 
on earth. Perhaps they cannot survive under such conditions, but the eventual collapse of the democracies 
would not, in itself, show that this was the cause – any more than it would show that human societies require 
kings or established religion, or that political community cannot exist outside of small city-states” (Rorty, 
1994: 195-196). 
5 In the previous passages I follow the interpretation of Rorty’s pragmatism in Kurelić (2002: 151). 
6 But Kurelić also argues that Rorty does not believe very strongly that the mere removal of objectivism 
somehow helps the sense of solidarity or the sense of community, so he decides to minimize the social 
importance of philosophy (Kurelić, 2001: 155-159). 
 
Matan, A., A Well-Ordered Society as ..., Politička misao, Vol. XLI, (2004), No. 5, pp. 123–133 127 
                                                                                                                                              
of his fellow humans share his beliefs or his “vocabulary”7. Rorty hopes that a time will 
come when everybody will become what he calls “a liberal ironist”, that everybody will 
become “a sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central 
beliefs and desires… someone who has abandoned the ideal that those central beliefs 
and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and space” (Rorty, 1989: xv).  
 He is nonetheless aware that such a time has not yet come and that most people 
“want to be taken on their own terms – taken seriously just as they are and just as they 
talk” (Rorty, 1989: 89). In other words, most people do love God and do think that there 
is a Truth “out there”, and it would be cruel to try and convince them that God and 
Truth are just “vocabularies” or “language games” with no correspondence to reality. It 
would amount to crushing the favorite toys of a child. So, Rorty claims, how ironists see 
non-ironists is ironists’ private matter. For public purposes the only important thing is to 
be conscious of all the possible ways in which we might humiliate others and to avoid 
inflicting such humiliation. All that is needed for such purpose is “imaginative identifi-
cation” with our fellow humans, whereas the beliefs held by other people, as well as our 
beliefs about “the nature of their selves” do not stand in the way of our ability for em-
pathy (Rorty, 1989: 92-93). Furthermore, Rorty stresses, arguing against Nietzsche and 
Foucault, that the “decrease in pain” achieved in the modern liberal societies compen-
sates for the constraints that their patterns of acculturation impose on their members in 
comparison with earlier societies. It also compensates for any loss in room for private 
self-creation (Rorty, 1994: 63). Thus, some “justification” for liberal democracies 
comes from historical evidence that these societies score comparatively better in terms 
of diminishing pain and suffering. 
 A third claim in favor of democracy calls upon the need for citizens’ acceptance of 
democratic institutions (Kurelić, 2001: 163). In a nutshell, we only need a consensus to 
accept the outcomes of a democratic decision making processes. Connected with this 
claim is an argument about the reasons people might have to join in such a consensus. 
The social glue holding together the ideal liberal society… consists in little more than a 
consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody have a chance at self-
creation to the best of his or her abilities, and that that goal requires, besides peace and 
wealth, the standard ‘bourgeois freedoms’. This view will not be based on a view about 
universally shared human ends, human rights, the nature of rationality, the Good for 
Man, nor anything else (Rorty, 1989: 84-85). 
 The arguments in the second and the third claim are connected by what Kurelić, 
interpreting Rorty, calls “the incommensurability of public and private concerns” (Ku-
relić, 2001: 160). Rorty’s liberalism rests its case on a division between a private vo-
cabulary, something that Rawls would call a conception of the good, and a public, 
pragmatic support for liberal democracy. Thus, democratic citizens with “dissimilar 
moral identities – identities built, for example, around the love of God, Nietzchean self-
 
7 This is how Rorty defines “vocabulary”: “All human beings carry about a set of words which they 
employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate praise 
of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects and our highest hopes. They are the words 
in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I shall call 
these words a person’s ‘final vocabulary’” (Rorty, 1989: 73). 
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overcoming, the accurate representation of reality as it is in itself, the quest for ‘one 
right answer’ to moral questions, or the natural superiority of a given character type”, 
for “pragmatic, rather than moral reasons” are “loyal citizens of a liberal democratic so-
ciety”. People, who “despise their fellow citizens… may be ruefully grateful” that a lib-
eral state leaves them alone (Rorty, 1994: 192). Rorty’s philosophical stance is thus 
somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he praises Rawls for his ‘articulation’ of ‘the 
way we live now’, but on the other hand he seems to claim that not even such ‘articula-
tion’ is needed. Furthermore, he is inviting his fellow philosophers to give up on ideas 
about God and Truth and to ‘treat chance as worthy of determining our fate’ (Rorty, 
1989: 22). Still, he does not believe that anything at all depends on it, since in his liberal 
utopia solidarity is created by “imaginative identification” with the suffering of others, 
enabled primarily by “the novel, the movie and the TV program” (Rorty, 1989: xvi). 
Rawls’ arguments about congruence and stability are intended to prevent exactly the 
split between the private and the public concerns that Rorty understands as unavoidable 
and useful.  
 
Rawls’ “Justification” of Democracy 
 Rawls shares with Rorty two commitments differing only in minor details. Both 
thinkers are committed to address the problem of social justice in a way independent 
from an enquiry about the “truth out there”8 and to offer a vision of liberal utopia. As 
opposed to Rorty who tries to convince us that it is useless and even damaging to search 
for the “truth out there”, Rawls is simply trying to “bracket” such questions in order to 
proceed freely towards a conception of justice which “best approximates our considered 
judgements of justice and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic 
society.” (Rawls, 1999a:xviii) Concerning utopian issues, in Rorty’s ideal liberal society 
“the intellectuals would… be ironists” while everybody else would be “a commonsensi-
cal nonmetaphysicians, in the way in which more and more people in the rich democra-
cies have been commonsensical nontheists” (Rorty, 1989: 87) Rawls does not think that 
people have become nontheists, and he does not expect them to become nonmetaphysi-
cians. But, even if that were true, Rorty would still insist that liberal democracies could 
survive on common hopes that the present day institutions of liberal democracies can 
and would be improved by social reform. Neither Rorty’s nor Rawls’ utopia require that 
the present day liberal democracies “be replaced, as soon as possible, by something 
utterly different” (Rorty, 1997: 7). 
 Rawls’ only hope is that citizens of democratic societies, governed by a liberal con-
ception of justice would find enough room to fit such a conception in their religious or 
metaphysical doctrines. In order to show that his utopia is realistic, Rawls has to show 
that (constitutional) democracy is worth our while not only as a most bearable political 
practice, but also as a coherent political and social ideal. Although Rawls does agree 
with Rorty that in order for a justification to get off the ground, we must share at least 
some premises, he thinks that there is a problem to be solved even when citizens of a 
 
8 See Rawls’ 1974 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association “The Independence of 
Moral Theory” (Rawls, 1999: 286-302).  
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democratic society largely accept liberal democratic institutions. So, Rawls does not try 
to convince a Nazi, or a white supremacist or a militant religious fundamentalist of the 
benefits of liberal democracy9. Rawls addresses “citizens of faith”. As Laden points out, 
“he is concerned with the kinds of reasons that can be given to support such a regime on 
the assumption that it is something we already wish to support”10 (Laden, 2003: 381). 
Rawls is trying to show that liberal democracies are in fact worthy of their citizens’ al-
legiance only if liberal democracies can be understood as an institutional expression of a 
certain conception (or a family of liberal conceptions) of justice. In order to do that 
Rawls has first to show that there is a conception of justice “for a democratic society”11.  
 Rawls is thus not involved in a circular argumentation by accident. He must be able 
to show that his justice as fairness can be accepted by a democratic society (meaning by 
citizens who understand themselves as free and equal), but also that his conception of 
justice would require democracy (of a certain kind). As we saw, Rorty admires this cir-
cularity, but he is not making it quite plain how big the circle is. Rorty’s own view on 
the priority of democracy, and his interpretation of Rawls sometimes sound very much 
like this: We support liberal democracy because this is what we believe in. This might 
be quite enough, Rawls may also admit of that, for someone who is not part of “we”. 
Still, “we” must be able to justify our institutions to ourselves, each citizen to each citi-
zen since “we” in the democratic countries (through a share of our political rights) exer-
cise coercive power over each other. The basic question for Rawls is this: “By what ide-
als and principles, then, are citizens who share equally in ultimate political power to ex-
ercise that power so that each can reasonably justify his or her political decisions to eve-
ryone?” (Rawls, 1999b: 578). And the answer is not simply: “by our ideals”, but by 
principles that everybody can agree to when put in conditions of equality. But what are 
the proper conditions of equality? It is not simply the situation of equal basic rights, or 
as Rorty calls them ‘bourgeois freedoms’ because it is exactly those rights and freedoms 
 
9 As Rawls’ close friend Burton Dreben stresses: “Rawls is a good enough thinker not to argue against 
who do not believe in liberal democracy” Dreben in Freeman (2003). 
10 This claim may be supported by the peculiarities of the reception of A Theory of Justice both in the US 
and Europe. A Theory of Justice despite its being a long book written not in a popular and accessible style, 
attracted much attention from a wider intellectual audience. This interest came as a surprise to the professional 
philosophers who were already acquainted with the main ideas of the Theory through Rawls’ articles and 
manuscripts (Daniels, 1989: xxxii). Professional philosophers can easily miss Rawls’ attempt to write from a 
position of a citizen since philosophers tend to translate every reference to what we accept, and our considered 
judgements into claims about what every rational human being can and should accept. But a wider intellectual 
audience in the US, affected by the events surrounding the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement and the 
counter-culture of the 60’s, could welcome a coherent restatement of their ideals. For those who do want to 
live in a just society and do think that liberal democracies are at least as ideals just, A Theory of Justice is 
supposed to provide arguments in favour of their deepest beliefs about justice in society. Obviously, a large 
part of the European intellectual audience unwilling to concede that liberal democracy is an ideal of a just 
regime ignored Rawls altogether. Those who think that liberal democracy is not a worthy ideal, and that its 
institutions should be replaced with something “utterly different”, Rawls is of no interest whatsoever, except 
as an intellectual exercise. For the reception of Rawls in Europe see a special issue of the European Journal of 
Political Theory (2002).  
11 For a detailed analysis of Rawls’ “democratic credentials” see Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic Society 
in Freeman (2003).  
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that we want to see in a clearer light.12 So we are in a search for a consensus on “reason-
able conditions” in order to build them into the original position. Rawls is in fact 
speaking of three agreements. An agreement among us, here and now, about the set up 
of the original position, an agreement between the parties in the original position, and 
finally the acceptance of those principles by citizens of an ideally just society as a stan-
dard for resolving their disputes. Why is such an ideal important for democratic poli-
tics? Here’s part of Rawls’ answer: The acceptance of the principles of… justice forges 
the bonds of civic friendship and establishes the basis of comity amidst the disparities 
that persist. Citizens are able to recognize one another’s good faith and desire for justice 
even though agreement may occasionally break down on constitutional questions and 
most certainly on many issues of policy (Rawls, 1999a: 454). 
 Rorty is right that Rawls is not looking for foundations, but he is neither interested 
in a defense of a democratic political practice. He is rather concerned with a defense of 
an ideal. Rawls does rely on a present consensus (on the fixed points in our considered 
judgments about justice), but only to assemble elements for a new one, a consensus on a 
desirability and feasibility of a well-ordered society regulated by principles of justice. It 
is the commonality and soundness of such an ideal that keeps democratic societies to-
gether.13 
 Still, the main difference between Rawls and Rorty lies in their accounts of moral 
motivation and the connection between private and public concerns. Rorty claims that a 
basic moral capacity is a capacity for empathy, and thus stresses the need for “senti-
mental education” in order to cultivate and extend empathy to as many of those whom 
we have not previously included in “the we group”. Our public conduct is then guided 
by our desire not to humiliate others. But, for Rorty, there is no answer to the question 
“When do you decide when to struggle against injustice and when to devote yourself to 
private projects of self-creation?” (Rorty, 1989: xv). So it might turn out that justice is 
actually ruinous for our private projects and in some sense a luxury that only the rich 
can afford.  
 Rawls, as opposed to that, wants to show how justice can be part of our “good”.14 
Only if justice can become part of our “good” a just society will be possible. If the de-
mands of justice prove to be in a sharp contrast to the pursuit of our “private” good, we, 
 
12 We may speculate that Rawls shares Rorty’s concern to “save” bourgeois freedoms from the Marxist 
Ideologiekritik, but Rawls is not sure that pointing to their positive effects would be enough to do the job. See 
Bernstein’s criticism or Rorty in Bernstein (1987: 552). 
13 Rorty is also aware of the need for an ideal, but he links that ideal with the idea of national pride. In his 
criticism of the American left he writes: “You have to be loyal to a dream country rather than to the one to 
which you wake up every morning. Unless such loyalty exists, the ideal has no chance of becoming actual” 
(Rorty, 1997: 101). 
14 Rawls in the third part of his A Theory of Justice tries to show two things: “that, in a well-ordered 
society, being a good person (and in particular having an effective sense of justice) is indeed a good for that 
person; and second that this form of society is a good society” (Rawls, 1999a: 505). Revisions in this part of 
the theory brought the concept of an overlapping consensus and the idea of public reason to the fore in 
Political liberalism (1993). The changes, although important, preserve Rawls’ commitment to assure stability 
and congruence to his conception of justice.  
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as citizens, in light of such knowledge, can not rely on each other to act in accordance 
with just institutions. We cannot create and maintain the bonds of civic friendship cru-
cial for a functioning democracy. Acting as justice requires is a way to show respect to 
our co-citizens. Only if we give and receive justice we can be sure that we do not hu-
miliate each other. Such an assurance is crucial for the stability of democratic regimes 
where every one shares in a political power to coerce the others. That is why the ques-
tions of stability and congruence come to the fore15.  
 In democratic societies where the citizens themselves create the rules by which they 
all should live, there must be a public commitment to a conception of justice that will 
guide the process of rule-creation, at least for the questions of basic justice. One cannot 
rely solely on constitutional engineering to assure just outcomes (Rawls, 1999a: 431-
32). Constitutional design is not an invisible hand able to turn intense conflict into a 
common good.16 As Rawls points out “a persistent majority, or an enduring alliance of 
strong enough interests, can make of the Constitution what it wants”17 (Rawls, 1999b: 
496). Knowing that does not prevent Rawls from demanding a fair value for the politi-
cal liberties, meaning public funding of political parties and candidates and other similar 
regulations for making politics less dependent on the “curse of money” (Rawls, 1999b: 
580). Still, the main guarantee for the fairness of the political process is citizen’s com-
mitment to offer reasons that others could accept. Only because we want to have a good 
enough approximation of the kinds of reasons that we can legitimately offer, we need a 
conception of the original position. Imagining people in a situation of equality gives us 
an idea of this approximation. And it is not a very hard thing to do.  
“In any society where people reflect on their institutions they will have an idea 
of what principles of justice would be acknowledged under the conditions [of 
equality], and there will be occasions when questions of justice are actually dis-
cussed in this way. If their practices do not accord with these principles, this will 
affect the quality of their social relations” (Rawls, 1999b: 58).  
“For in this case there will be some recognized situations in which persons are 
mutually aware that one of them is being forced to accept what the other would 
concede is unjust, at least applied to himself. One of them is, then, claiming a 
special status for himself, or openly taking advantage of his position. He thus in-
vites the other either to retaliate, when and in whatever way he can, or to ac-
knowledge that he is inferior” (Rawls, 1999b: 207). 
 In a society of equals, a situation as described above is unbearable. In a society of 
equals, the equality must be seen, acknowledged and respected. That’s why in a democ-
 
15 It is not certain that Rawls can in fact prove the stability of his conception of justice. Many 
commentators have tried to show not only that he fails, but also that he should have never pursued such a goal 
(Barry: 1995). My aim here was just to show that Rawls’ project is quite distinct from the pragmatic project of 
Richard Rorty, regardless of their respective success.  
16 Rawls unwillingness to accept constitutional design as a solution for the problem of stability is also 
pointed out in Kukhatas and Pettit (1990: 137). 
17 These words, written originally in 1989 sound quite prophetic as the US is facing the possibility of 
having a republican majority in all three branches of Government.  
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ratic society, a respect for justice is the best way to ensure equality and prevent hu-
miliation. But to serve its function, a sense of justice must be shown not as a “compul-
sive psychological mechanism cleverly installed by those in authority in order to insure 
[our] unswerving compliance with rules designed to advance their interest” (Rawls, 
1999a: 452). Justice must be shown to be in our interest.18 Rorty’s incommensurability 
strategy is not an option for Rawls. If Rawls cannot show that justice is, at least in prin-
ciple, in our interest, most of his enterprise will crumble. 
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